This is one of my essays for a Cognitive Science class, I received a grade of 70%. I did not form an argument, however I still think what I covered is interesting. And I am damn proud of my chess analogy.
In this essay the Physicalist perspective to the mind-body solution is expanded upon through interpreting Pre-Established Harmony, a sub-set theory of Dualism, through an Embodied Cognitive Science and Buddhist lens. Thereby formulating the theory of Interdependent Interactionism, which argues that the issue of interaction between Dualistic Substances can be better thought of through the physicalist lens of interdependent mind-body-enivironment interactions. This essay opens with two exegesis related to Dualism (and Pre-Established Harmony) as well as Embodied Cognitive Science (and Buddhist theories of Interdependence). After this, evidence from Embodied Cognitive Science is combined with Buddhist Interdependence to form Interdependent Interactionism, where Leibniz’s ‘common cause’ is used as a vector to interpret the issue of Dualistic interaction as interdependent interactions between mind-body-environment.
However, as highlighted in ‘Additional Considerations’ the ‘scope’ through which we consider Dualism and Interdependent Interactionism is important for the validity of argument. Due to this, further discussion is required; of which, a suggested vector may be a theology perspective inspired by the practice of Sufism. In totality, Interdependent Interaction is like a game of chess; which is dependent on the ‘coming-together’ of two ‘opposing’ forces (mind and body) facilitated by a chess board (the environment), all in all, leading to a game of chess (cognition).
Leibniz’s Pre-esthablished harmony highlights a central tension in Dualism: how independent and separate metaphysical substances, such as the mind and body, interact with one another (Robert 2022). In the following quote, Leibniz points to a ‘common source’ as responsible for interaction, “[such interaction] of different substances […] is one of the strongest proofs of […] a common cause.” (Robert 2022) What would such a ‘common cause’ look like? In this essay, I will argue for coupled dynamic interactions between the mind, body, and the environment as a contender for a ‘common cause’ between dualistic substances. Thereby, opposing dualism through considering Leibniz’s preestablished harmony through an embodied physicalist lens.
To make my argument, I will draw on empirical evidence from Embodied Cognitive Science, which is the study of the interactions between the body, brain, and environment (Davis & Markman, 2012) to provide empirical support for the basis of embodiment, further substantiating my claim. Additionally, I will draw on Buddhist teachings of interdependence to strengthen the philosophical weight of my argument. Henceforth, I will argue for Interdependent Interactionism, which proposes to oppose dualism through interpreting Leibniz’s Pre-Established Harmony through Embodied Cognitive Science. Thereby, considering the environment as the ‘common source’ between mind and body, ultimately leading to the facilitation of cognition.
The Mind Body Problem
The mind-body problem is concerned with the problem of explaining how ‘mental processes’ (such as conscious experience) relate to ‘physical processes.’ (such as neurons firing during cognitive tasks (Shine et al. 2016)). Producing a solution to the mind-body problem has remained a central task of scientific, philosophical, and intellectual pursuits since its inception (Armstrong, 1999). Such a solution will not only reveal how the mind and body interact, but will also aid in understanding Cognition as a whole (Armstrong, 1999). While there are several proposed ‘solutions’ to the mind-body problem, this essay will focus its scope exclusively on Dualism’s theory and its issue of ‘substance interaction’ (the issue of how spiritual and physical processes interact).
Dualism
Dualism asserts that reality consists of two fundamental identities: that of physical entities, which occupy and extend out into space, and non-physical entities, which do not occupy space (Robinson, 2018). Dualism can be best understood through the foundation work of Descartes’ Cartesian Dualism, a view of reality, which posits that only two substances exist: The mind, which is a spiritual and material substance. And the body, which is of material substance (Robinson, 2018).
Through Dualism, cognition is understood to be the unity of physical and spiritual substances, commonly viewed as caused by divine means (Armstrong 1999, pg. 3). However, the exact mechanism behind unification and how such ‘independent’ and ‘separate’ substances interact remains unexplained in Descartes’ original dissertation (Shapiro et al. 2007). In correspondence between Descartes and Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (a critic of Dualism), Descartes implicates the pineal gland, the only non-mirrored cortical organ, as the mechanism by which the spiritual reacts with the physical (Shapiro et al. 2007). However, ‘substance interaction’ through the pineal gland cannot be proven, thereby, leaving the mechanism of ‘substance interaction’ unclear.
Because of this logical flaw, Physicalistic schools of thought, which propose that all phenomena can be explained by physical processes (Robinson 2018), become more plausible. Even within Dualistic schools of thought, cannot escape commenting on substance interaction, and are often drawn to physicalistic-esqe explanations. In the next section, we will explore one such instance.
Pre-Established Harmony
Proposed by Leibniz, Pre-Established Harmony elegantly highlights the quagmire of substance interaction within dualism, as showcased below:
“[T]his mutual correspondence of different substances (which cannot act upon one another, if one speaks with metaphysical strictness, and which yet harmonize as if they did act upon one another) is one of the strongest proofs of God’s existence or of a common cause.” (Robert, 2022)
Leibniz highlights that if Dualism holds, then interaction– life as we know it– should be impossible, yet this is not the case. Therefore, some other “common cause” must be behind the interaction, while God is a common solution to the ‘Dualistic issue of interaction’ (Armstrong 1999, pg. 3); I would like to dismiss this claim to expand upon Leibniz’s ‘common cause.’ Instead, I will interpret the ‘common’ causes as embodied interactions between mind-body-environment-– as understood through cognitive science-– thereby converting Pre-Established Harmony into a physicalist theory. The exact mechanism of which will be expanded upon in the next section.
Overview of Cognitive Science
Cognitive Science is the interdisciplinary study of the mind, encompassing many fields such as anthropology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, philosophy, psychology, to name a few (Oberlander, 2006). Cognitive Science produces several findings and frameworks in regards to ‘what it means to be a cognitive agent’ (Stillings, 1995). Thereby, Cognitive Science shows promise to produce a solution to the mind-body problem, through systematic investigation and eventually modeling of the mind (Chambliss, 2018).
Historically, cognitive science has made attempts at solving the mind-body problem through frontiers such as: Good Old Fashioned Artificial-Intelligence (GOFAI), which can be traced back to Alan Turning’s seminal work in the 1950s (Muggleton, 2014). Secondly, Connectism around the 1960s (Walmsley, 2012 pg. 89). Lastly, Dynamical Systems Theory as proposed by Van Gelder in 1998 (Walmsley, 2012 pg. 133). Note: Due to the scope of this paper, these theories are not explored in depth; please see Walmsley (2012) for further reading.
Of substantial interest to this paper is the turn towards embodiment that Cognitive science made (Connell, 1989). Of this era, Connell’s soda can collecting robot is of particular interest, showcasing intelligent behaivour dependent on environmental facilitation and feedback (Connell, 1989). Thus marking a new frontier within Cognitive Science: Embodied Cognitive Science.
Embodied Cognitive Science
Embodied Cognitive Science is a framework to understanding cognition that focuses on the interaction between processes such as thought, emotion, environment, and sensorimotor loops (Davis & Markman 2012; Varga & Heck, 2017). Such a view is critical to pushing our holistic understanding of cognition, as the mind, body, and environment are dynamically coupled through millions of years of evolution (Sousa et al. 2017). Thereby permitting new advances in the theory of our mind, which reveals thought, emotion, sensorimotor loops, and the environment as deeply intertwined and interdependent (Miller et al. 2015; Barrett & Lindquist, 2008). Furthermore, discussions surrounding embodied cognition have opened up discussions with Buddhism over the embodied and environmentally-dependent nature of the mind (Hashi, 2012), further emphasizing the applicability and philosophical weight of embodied cognition.
Wrapping up the exegesis.
So far we have sketched a few major points: Firstly, the theory of dualism asserts that the mind and body are two separate and distinct identities; that of the soul and physical processes. However, dualism cannot account for how the mind and body interact.
Secondly, Leibniz’s pre-established harmony theorizes that some ‘common source’ must be responsible for the apparent ‘harmonized’ interaction of dualistic substances.
Thirdly, Cognitive Science is the interdisciplinary study of the mind, containing the field of Embodied Cognitive Science, the scientific study of the interaction between the mind, body, and the environment.
Lastly, discussions of embodiment within cognitive science have opened up a dialogue with Buddhist schools of thought, which also stress the importance of the environment in facilitating cognition through the theory of ‘interdependence.’
Henceforth I will lay out my argument for Interdependent Interactionism: mind-body-environment interactions as currently understood by Cognitive science may serve as the ‘common’ harmonizing factor within Leibniz’s pre-established harmony. Thus, opposing dualism through providing a physicalist interpretation of the ‘substance interaction’ issue, thereby advancing physicalism.
Interdependent Interactionism
Consider the following analogy: The mind and body represent the two opposing forces in a game of chess. The board, which is analogous to the environment, facilitates the interactions between the two sides. Thus leading to the game of chess, or cognition, as we know it.
Hereby, cognition is considered to involve the interplay between three primary entities, namely: the mind, the body, and the environment. To illustrate this concept, let us consider this excerpt from Kiverstein & Miller (2015) based on Lewis (2005):
‘‘Mr. Smart slams on the brakes when noticing the proximity
of the car in front. Anger arises initially from frustration, as
Mr. Smart wants to keep driving fast, but also from a sense
of violated entitlement: he is in the left lane and should not
have to slow down. Fear may also be triggered by the close
call, eliciting further anger because of an intermediate evaluation
of unmanly helplessness. These emotions arise rapidly, but they are paralleled by a co-emerging sense of the other driver as
intentionally obstructive (and therefore blameworthy). Mr. Smart’s
highly focused visual attention, a derivative of anger, takes in the
red color of the car ahead, as well as the expensive-looking design,
and his anger is amplified by his sense of the unfairness of this show-
off blocking his path (based on an implicit memory of some long-
forgotten or fantasized rival). A stabilizing angry-anxious state,
coupled with ruminative plans for vengeance (perhaps a blast of
the horn), anchors attention to the head of the man in front. This
lasts for a minute or two while Mr. Smart fashions and modifies
plans to pass on the right. However, when the man peers over his
shoulder, Mr. Smart evaluates this act as a taunt, generating shame
and anger in an elaborated appraisal of humiliation, and calling
for extreme action to save his self-image from further subjugation’’
(Lewis, 2005, p. 175).
Here we see road rage portrayed as an epiphenomena of the following deeply interdependent processes: Mental processes, which cause Mr Smart to feel violated entitlement, recall negatively-valent memories, and experience several emotions. Bodily processes, which manifest in focused visual-attention. Environmental cues, the ‘close call’, and the red-expensive car.
Such a view of Embodied ‘interdependent’ Cognition is not absurd nor novel. Core Buddhist teachings emphasize that all phenomena exist due to the interactions between other phenomena (Edelglass & Garfield, 2009, pg. 26 ), which we will expand upon below.
Buddhist Interdependence
In Buddhist literature, all phenomena are perceived as empty of ‘essence’ that is, lacking any permanent or fundamental features and/or properties (Edelglass & Garfield, 2009, pg 26). Instead, all phenomena are causally dependent on each other, arising together in interdependence (Edelglass & Garfield, 2009, pg 26). Yet, why do we experience discrimination in our perception? According to the Buddhists, these ‘conventional truths’ are due to an untrained mind. Empirically, we can trace this to research that indicates perception is heavily reliant on linguistic (discriminatory) interpretation (Bamberg, 1997).
While discussions between Buddhism and Embodied Cognition have only just begun, what I have just outlined further strengthens the philosophical weight of the interdependence between mind-body-environment in the facilitation of cognition.
Therefore, we can critique Dualism through expanding Physicalism’s domain into an Embodied Cognitive Science informed Pre-Established Harmony. Through considering the interactions between the mind, body, and environment, as the ‘common cause’ Leibniz describes (Robert 2022). However, this assertion can be argued against, which will be explored in the next section.
Additional Considerations
One can argue that: practically speaking, the mind, body, and the environment appear to have independent features. For example, we are capable of ‘offline cognition’ that is thinking of stimuli without the stimuli present in the environment (van Dijk & Withagen 2015). The body can continue on after the cessation of brain function (Goila & Pawar, 2009). And lastly, the environment can seemingly function without human mind/body interference.
Therefore, in practical senses, dualism can still be held as possible. However, this still muddies the waters, as it seems to suggest that dualism’s validity is dependent on the scope of the argument. To expand this, Interdependent Interactionism offers an alternative parsimonious metaphysical theory to Dualism, supported through Embodied Cognitive Science research and Buddhist thought.
Yet, we seem to seem to reach a standstill, for empirical evidence exists for both sides of the argument. What I then suggest is further inquiry into the ‘scope’ to which we attempt to apply Dualism and Physicalism, as further ground may lie nestled in nuance. Such ventures may look like the exploration of Sufism, the mystical interpretation of Islam (Tas & Yurtsever, 2010), as a potential vehicle of insight. For example, In Sufism, God is considered causal to creation (Goodman et al, 2009. pg 133-4), thus providing an affirmative theological reading to Leibniz’s quote, “[the apparent mutual codependence] is the strongest proof of God.’ Such a dialogue between Interdependent Interactionism and Sufism may expand the former’s domain into theology.
On The Game of Chess
In conclusion Leibniz’s pre-established harmony points out the problem of interactionism within Dualism. Implicating the need of some ‘common cause’ to unite the metaphysically separate categories of mind and body. Such a common cause can be understood as the environment, as sketched by the Buddhist teachings of interdependence, and as supported by the empirical findings of Embodied Cognitive Science.
Therein, the argument of interdependent interactionism is the assertion that the deeply interdependent interactions between the mind, body, and environment is a physicalist solution to the Dualistic issue of ‘substance interaction’ through Pre-Established Harmony. Hereby, gaining ground over Dualism, advancing the physicalistic solution to the mind-body problem, and providing an avenue to cognition; which like the game of chess, is facilitated by the interdependence of the chess board (the environment), and the two ‘opposing’ yet ‘dependent’ forces (the mind and body).
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